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1. WOULD PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A
UNITED STATES CITIZEN WITHOUT CHARGE IN A MILITARY BRIG FOR
SIX MONTHS IF THAT CITIZEN-WHO LIVES IN MINNESOTA-IS
SUSPECTED OF LINKS TO AL QAEDA FOLLOWING A ONE-MONTH TRIP
TO SOMALIA?
International human rights law prohibits peacetime preventive
detention even with a judge's supervision for periods as long as six
months. A person taking part in the fighting in Afghanistan could be
detained in a military brig-preferably in Afghanistan-until the end
of the hostilities in that country. As there are no hostilities in
Minnesota, peacetime criminal law rules apply and those require that
fundamental due process be respected.
All human beings everywhere and at all times enjoy fundamental
human rights based on the fact they are human. No government
official, whether acting pursuant to a domestic law or not, may take
away these rights. Human rights are founded in international law. To
deny human rights is to violate international law. No government
official has "authority" to violate international law-no government
official should wish to do so.'
Some people responding to this question might answer by point-
ing out that Congress could authorize the President to hold a person
in detention for six months so long as it was consistent with the
Constitution's provision for the writ of habeas corpus as recently
2interpreted by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush . Since the
time of the Nuremberg Tribunal, however, the international commu-
nity has not permitted appeals to domestic law as a defense to
international law violations. Even if the President and Congress
succeeded in developing national law permitting military detention
without charge for six months that complied with the Constitution-
no easy task-such action could not change international law.
International law prohibits long detention without trial except in the
case of persons detained during an armed conflict.
Human rights law is clear that no one may be detained without
1. For more on international law in general, why it binds and the benefits it
provides to the United States and all states, see MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER
AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ENFORCEMENT (2008).
2. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
[Vol. 36:55128
TEN QUESTIONS: O'CONNELL
due process, including knowing the grounds for the detention,
judicial oversight, and if the detention is to last more than a brief
period, the person is entitled to a speedy trial. Only persons detained
during an armed conflict may be detained for longer periods without
trial, but even then, only until the end of the hostilities in which the
person was detained. The Geneva Conventions require outside
monitoring of wartime detainees by such ualified monitors as the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
Plainly the critical concept in this question is, therefore, whether
the detention in Minnesota could be made pursuant to an "armed
conflict." The International Law Association's Committee on the Use
of Force provided an initial report on the definition of armed conflict
in 2008. The Report states:
Looking to relevant treaties-in particular IHL treaties-
rules of customary international law, general principles of
international law,judicial decisions and the writing of scho-
lars.... the Committee has found evidence of at least two
characteristics with respect to all armed conflict:
1.) The existence of organized armed groups
2.) Engaged in fighting of some intensity
4
In Minnesota, at the time of writing, there is no intense armed
fighting between organized armed groups. There is no armed
conflict being waged in Minnesota or anywhere on the territory of the
United States. In only the case of two persons,Jos6 Padilla and Ali al-
Marri, did the U.S. government purport to recognize an armed
conflict on the territory of this country. At the same time, almost 300
million Americans lived under peacetime criminal law. Indeed, both
defendants were initially arrested under peacetime criminal law, then
transferred to military detention as "unlawful combatants", then
transferred back to the criminal system.5 The episodes would have
3. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The American Society of International Law Adopts A
Resolution on the Use of Force and Treatment of Detainees, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 19, 2006,
http://www.asil.org/insights060519.cfm.
4. INT'L LAW ASS'N, COMM. ON THE USE OF FORCE, INITIAL REPORT ON THE
MEANING OFARMED CONFLIcT IN INT'L LAW 1-2 (2008). See also Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Defining Armed Conflict, 13J. CONFLICT & SECURITYL. 393 (2008).
5. AI-Marri's case was concluded with a plea bargain as a result of which he will
face up to 15 years in prison. See Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Ali AI-Marri Pleads
Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Qaeda (Apr. 30,2009). Padilla
is appealing his criminal conviction at time of writing. See Brian Jackson, Padilla
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been comical but for the fact they involved denying human beings
their fundamental human rights.
It is plain that the law requires that all persons on the territory of
the United States under the conditions that have prevailed since the
Civil War be treated as criminal suspects if law enforcement officials
have sufficient evidence to charge the individual with a crime. In that
case a person may be detained.
The most important source of peacetime human rights protec-
tions for detainees in the United States is the International Civil and
Political Rights Covenant 6 The ICCPR allows for derogation from
the detention protections found in Article 9 during a national
emergency, but formal steps must be taken if derogations are claimed.
The United States has not formally derogated from its ICCPR
detention obligations. If it did seek to derogate, derogation is
permitted only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation." The U.N. Human Rights Committee, charged with
implementing the ICCPR, has said, "Measures derogating from the
provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary
nature."7
As the criminal courts of the United States are open and func-
tioning, making a case for derogation would appear to be difficult.
Nor is it clear what reason could be given in the current circums-
tances for holding a person for a period longer than a few days to
perhaps two weeks without charge.
2. WOULD IT BE LEGAL FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO
LAUNCH A PREDATOR STRIKE ON OSAMA BIN LADEN IF HE HAS BEEN
TRACKED TO A HOUSE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN?
Few would wonder about the answer to this question if it read,
"Would it be legal to launch a drone attack on an al Qaeda member
tracked to a house on the outskirts of Karachi?" Law enforcement
measures need to be used in a place like Karachi, which, like Minne-
sota, experiences crime, but is not the scene of an armed conflict.
The choice of military versus police methods depends on the facts of
fighting, not the individual being targeted.
Drone attacks involve significant firepower-this is not the force
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
7. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 29: States ofEmergency (Article 4), 2,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.ll (Aug. 21, 2001).
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of the police, but of the military. In law enforcement it must be
possible to warn a suspect before using lethal force; in war-fighting
this is usually not necessary, making the use of bombs and missiles
lawful. Drones carry powerful missiles capable of significant damage."
The United Nations Basic Principles for the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials are widely adopted by police
throughout the world. They set out the general rule for the lawful use
of lethal force in Article 9:
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against per-
sons except in self-defense or defense of others against the
imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave
threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger
and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape,
and only when less extreme means are insufficient to
achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use
of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in
order to protect life.
It is not possible to give a warning from a drone or to affect an
arrest should the suspect surrender. Thus drones, like bomber
aircraft, cannot lawfully be used in law enforcement.
It may be difficult for some to keep personal preferences out of
their assessment of this question. Yet, as members of a profession,
legal scholars, lawyers, and judges must do just that. Regardless of
personal animosity toward Osama bin Laden, even in his case the law
must prevail if we are not to stoop to the very contempt for law and
the value of human life displayed by al Qaeda. The law requires law
enforcement methods outside of combat zones.
3. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ADVISING THAT THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS DID NOT APPLY TO AL QAEDA AND THE
TALIBAN?
Malpractice depends on state bar association rules or standards
8. For more on the international law governing drones, see Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in
SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOvERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt
ed.) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144.
9. Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Clime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 Aug.-7 Sept. 1990, Basic
Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990).
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enforced by the federal Government's Office of Professional Respon-
sibility. I will let others with specific expertise respecting these
standards comment on whether the memo writers violated them in
the case of this memo or others that have become known collectively
as the "torture memos."'1 I can confirm, however, that the memo on
the Geneva Conventions and other torture memos are replete with
errors, erroneous reasoning, omissions, and illogic. The only one
likely explanation for the shockingly poor quality of the memos,
especially given the qualifications of the lawyers involved, is that the
authors intended to reach conclusions the law did not support.
The memo on the Geneva Conventions concludes that the Con-
ventions do not apply to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Yet,
the Conventions could not be more straightforward: all persons
caught up in armed conflict have the protections of the Geneva
Conventions-all persons. There is no exception for persons we do
not like.
According to Article 2 common to all four 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, the Conventions apply during armed conflict on the territory of
states party to the Convention. The United States and Afghanistan
are parties to the Conventions. (Indeed, today all sovereign states of
the world are parties.) The United States and Great Britain launched
an armed conflict on the territory of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.
There is no doubt that the Convention protections applied to all
persons in Afghanistan whether American, British, or Afghan
combatant, or civilian.
The OLC memo on the application of the Geneva Conventions
tries to extrapolate from certain restrictive provisions of one conven-
tion, the Third Geneva Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of
War, to exclude Taliban and al Qaeda members from any protections.
The Third Conventions extends certain privileges upon detention to
the "regular" members of a state's armed forces and certain militia
members, who wear uniforms, are organized under a command and
follow the international law regulating the use of force." Afghanis-
tan's Taliban fighters were the regular armed forces of the state and
qualified even under the Third Convention for the privileged status of
10. This memo and the memo mentioned in Question Four are reproduced in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds. 2005).
11. See generally George Aldrich, The Taliban, AL Qaeda, and the Determination of
Illegal Combatants, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 891 (2002); Knut D6rmann, The Legal Situation of
"Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants, "85 INr'L REv. RED CROSs 45 (2003); Marco Sass6li,
Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 LAW & INEQ. 195 (2004).
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prisoners of war. I do not have sufficient facts to know the category to
which al Qaeda fighters would properly have been assigned in 2001.
We may never know these facts. Nevertheless, persons who are
detained and do not qualify for prisoner of war status, are held under
the Fourth Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of Armed Conflict. There are no gaps in the Geneva
Conventions for regulating wartime detention.
Moreover, by 2002, the 1949 Conventions had been supple-
mented by rules of customary international law. In particular, all
persons detained in an international armed conflict are protected by
the "Fundamental Guarantees" of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I.
The United States affirmed during the Reagan administration that the
United States recognized the binding nature of Article 75 as customa-
ry international law and its obvious application to lawful and unlawful
combatants as well as civilians. The OLC memo never mentions
customary international law.
The comprehensive application of the Geneva Conventions dur-
ing armed conflict is law of armed conflict 101. That law was blatantly
ignored, even over the protest of the State Department's Office of
Legal Adviser.
We now have evidence as to why such a slipshod memo was pro-
duced. As early as November 2001, with the issuance of a Presidential
Order on treatment of al Qaeda detainees, it became apparent that
the Bush administration wished to claim the right to kill without
warning and detain without trial any person suspected of being a
member of al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations-wherever
found. The administration attempted to justify these claims by
asserting that the entire world became a combat zone on 9/11 when
President Bush declared a "global war on terror." But along with the
claim to kill and detain, administration leaders apparently had no
interest in extending the Geneva Convention protections to the
"global war." Those protections were done away with in a memo that
conveniently misread the Conventions and fifty years of scholarship.
The memo gave permission to claim wartime rights and skip wartime
duties.
Even when wartime protections do not apply, however, as ex-
plained in the answers to Question One, peacetime human rights
protections apply. Human beings are never without the protection of
the law. This fact is never mentioned in any of the memos. President
Obama has also referred to the "global war on terror." All indications
so far are that his administration is continuing to apply his predeces-
2010] 5133
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
sor's erroneous interpretation of the law.
4. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ITS WRITTEN GUIDANCE
TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON INTERROGATION
STANDARDS?
Again, experts on professional responsibility should assess the
case for malpractice. I can comment on the fact the August 2002
memorandum and several subsequent ones on interrogation are
replete with errors, misstatements, and omissions. I have read and re-
read the 2002 interrogation memo and subsequent ones based upon
it. I have found an average of one major error per page. I will just
describe three of the more extraordinary errors here. Indeed, these
errors are so blatant that they encourage the conclusion the memo is
not an attempt in good faith to assess the law but, rather, an attempt
to free the way for CIA interrogators to use unlawful techniques of
interrogation.
Among the more astounding errors in the 2002 memo: First, in
the opening pages of the memo, customary international law is
dismissed as not binding on the Federal Government. One of the
memo's authors, John Yoo, had promoted this position in his
scholarship before joining the Office of Legal Counsel. It was not,
however, the law of the land in 2002; it is just as clearly not the law
today. The binding Supreme Court precedent on the place of
customary in the American legal system is the Paquete Habana case."
The Supreme Court said "international law is part of our law." The
court assessed and applied a rule of customary international law,
overturning an action of the United States Navy in conflict with it. In
2004, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Paquete Habana in Sosa v. Alveras-
12. The memo must have been written with CIA and CIA contract interrogators
in mind. Military interrogators are governed by the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice,
which implements the Geneva Conventions. These permit no coercive interrogation
of any kind-for legal, ethical, and practical reasons. See generally Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231 (2005)
(discussing the law of interrogation).
FBI interrogators follow the U.S. Constitution and domestic criminal law, which
also forbid torture and cruel and degrading treatment of persons being questioned.
It should also be noted that on 9/11, the CIA had no interrogator unit and no
training in standards of lawful, ethical, and effective interrogation methods-in
contrast to the military and FBI.
13. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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Machain,14 saying explicitly that international law is part of Federal
common law. There was no contrary Supreme Court ruling in the
years between. The great scholars of the place of international law in
U.S. law-Philip Jessup and Louis Henkin--confirmed at various
points in the Twentieth Century that this is the only position that
makes sense based on the drafting history of the Constitution, the
words of the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and the needs
of the United States in the world.
All of this was dismissed in a short paragraph in the 2002 memo
saying customary international law was only a concern of the fifty
states. Such an outlandish conclusion should have been obvious to
anyone reading the memo.
A second example concerns the failure of the memo writers to
cite the leading Supreme Court decision on presidential power in
wartime. The memo discusses at the president's commander-in-chief.
As of 2002, the universally acknowledged Supreme Court case on
point concerning presidential powers in wartime was Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure). 5 Youngstown is not cited in the
memo. Failure to cite the most important Supreme Court decision on
a point of law in a memo providing legal advice is generally consi-
dered a primafacie example of malpractice.
And a third example: the memo also devotes a good deal of space
to the Convention Against Torture to which the United States is a
party. There is much attention to the definition of torture. Most
people reading the Convention would have no difficulty understand-
ing and applying the definition of torture provided in Article 1. The
memo writers, however, purport to find the definition unclear. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the standard rules
of treaty interpretation for any case where a treaty's provisions are
unclear. The Vienna Convention rules happen to be the same basic
rules we use to interpret any legal text-contracts, statutes, regula-
tions, etc. The Vienna Convention requires that a treaty be read in
light of its objects and purpose. Where language is unclear, the treaty
as a whole should be considered. If that step is not successful, the
Vienna Convention provides for resort to the treaty's negotiating
history.
The memo writers did not have resort to the purpose of the Con-
vention Against Torture (eliminating torture and cruel, inhuman, and
14. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
15. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2010] 5135
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degrading treatment); they did not have resort to the treaty as a whole
(it forbids cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, as well as
torture-no real need to define torture because governments may not
do anything that even gets close to it), nor did the authors consult the
negotiating history of the treaty. Rather, they went to a completely
unrelated document, a U.S. health care statute, found a provision
there they liked, and from this statute, they constructed a definition of
torture that limited torture to actions inflicting the pain of "organ
failure or death."
These are only three errors from fifty pages of the main torture
memo. It seems hard to understand how any lawyer reading the
analysis could have put any reliance on it at all. The errors indicate
the memo was intended to give legal cover to interrogators using
torture as well as cruel and inhuman methods of interrogation. In
court, an interrogator could presumably hold up the thick memo and
say he had legal advice from the nation's top lawyers that anything
short of organ failure was permitted.
Twenty of the nation's most accomplished military interrogators
submitted the following statement to Congress onJuly 31, 2006:
We the undersigned, former active-duty Army Interrogators
(97E) and Interrogation Technicians (351E), believe the
following two statements to be true:
- Trained and skilled interrogators can accomplish the intel-
ligence gathering mission using only those interrogation
techniques found in Army Field Manual 34-52 (1992).
. Prisoner/detainee abuse and torture are to be avoided at
all costs, in part because they can degrade the intelligence
collection effort by interfering with a skilled interrogator's
efforts to establish rapport with the subject.
16
5. WHAT STATUTORY CHANGE IS MOST NECESSARY FOR U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY?
We need to repeal the Military Commissions Act of 2006.17 This
Act puts us in violation of our obligations under the Geneva Conven-
16. Statement of Interrogation Practices from Donald Marquis et al. to the
United States House of Representatives Committee on the Armed Services (July 31,
2006),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/denouncetorture/statementon-interrogation.pdf.
17. For more on this point and other legislative changes needed to rectify post-
9/11 missteps, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Way Forward: Post-9/11 Princdp/eSJuRIST,




tions. Once the Act is repealed, we need to investigate and prosecute
all of those complicit in the use of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading methods of interrogation as required by the Conventions.
So long as we are out of step with this fundamental international law,
we do not stand strong for the rule of law in the world. The surest way
to improve national security is to work to make respect for the rule of
law stronger than respect for violence.
6. WHAT CHANGE BY EXECUTIVE ORDER IS MOST NECESSARY FOR
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY?
Withdraw any orders authorizing targeted killing, detention, and
military commissions in violation of international law. See my
previous answer and citation.
8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?
The Soviet Union posed a true existential threat to the United
States. With nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union could have killed
every single American. Al Qaeda has no such power. But it has
induced us to abandon some of our most important values, especially
our commitment to the rule of law. Al Qaeda has induced us to
undermine our very identity, and, in so doing, our very existence as
the United States of America has been brought into question. This
weakening of who we are is a self-inflicted wound that requires urgent
and serious attention.
9. WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO IF IT CONFIRMS THAT
IRAN HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
The United States should do what it did when it discovered North
Korea had nuclear weapons, but not what it did when it discovered
India, Pakistan, and Israel had nuclear weapons. The United States
should pursue a variety of diplomatic and legal strategies to get
compliance by Iran and all other states with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty."'
International law generally prohibits the use of force in interna-
tional relations absent a significant armed attack or Security Council
18. See generally, Mary Ellen O'Connell & Maria Alveras-Chen, The Ban on the
Bomb--and Bombing, Iran, the US. and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRAcUsE
L. REV. 497 (2007).
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authorization. Even where there is a right to resort to armed force,
every use of force must be necessary and proportional. Those who
urge bombing Iranian nuclear research sites have no evidence that
such bombing will succeed in accomplishing the military objective or
can be done in a way that will not cause disproportionate loss of life
and destruction of property.
The U.N. Charter contains an explicit prohibition on the use of
force absent an armed attack or Security Council authorization.' 9 The
Security Council may authorize states to use force in broader
circumstances than self-defense to an armed attack.20 The Council
may authorize force against threats to the Reace as well as actual
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The Security Council,
along with all other entities resorting to a significant use of armed
force, however, must also comply with such general principles of
international law as necessity and proportionality. Under these rules,
no use of military force can be justified against Iran for carrying out
nuclear research. The great legal and moral imperative to preserve
the peace requires finding alternative responses short of force in
dealing with a situation like the one presented by Iran. The United
States, the European Union, Russia, China, and many other states
want Iran to comply with Security Council Resolutions demanding
that Iran stop enriching uranium and permit verification that it has
done so.22 Iran is obligated under international law to comply with
Security Council resolutions.' By the same token, those states
concerned with Iran's nuclear program must also comply with
international law and its prohibition on the use of force and unlawful
possession of nuclear weapons.
19. U.N. Charter art. 2 (4). For a detailed discussion of the law governing the
use of force, see MARYELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAWAND THE USE OF FORCE
(2d ed. 2009).
20. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.
21. Id.
22. See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737,
U.N. Doc S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
23. See U.N. Charter art. 25. See also Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August or Face Possible
Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions, U.N. Doc. SC/8792 (July 31, 2006). In late 2006,
Iran's primary violation of international law with respect to its nuclear program was
its failure to comply with S.C. Res. 1696. Id.
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10. WHEN WILL THE UNITED STATES CEASE TO BE THE WORLD'S
NUMBER-ONE POWER?
There are many indications that the United States is already per-
ceived as having fallen from the position of "the world's number-one
power."24 In my view, this perception began between March 2003 and
April 2004. "Power," "number-one power," "superpower," and similar
concepts are the product of ideas. "Power" is what we define it to be.
We have often included factors such as number of weapons, number
of soldiers, GDP, GNP, and the like as part of the calculation of
power. Those numbers, however, must be imbued with our under-
standing that they stand for power. They have never been the whole
definition. With the fall of the Soviet Union, simple numbers,
especially respecting military factors, are understood as far too limited
for a true understanding of power.
On 9/11 the world provided its support to the U.S., outraged at
the lawless, violent act of a few men. Despite all we lost that day, we
did not lose our standing in the world. But when the United States
invaded Iraq in defiance of international law and used arguments that
turned out to be false, the perception of our power took a hit. Those
perceptions declined even more clearly when the pictures emerged
from Abu Ghraib prison and the whole story of torture, abuse, secret
prisons, manipulation of law, and cover-ups became public.
Some might agree with these dates as marking our decline but
not with the reason offered here. They may prefer to note our
military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, seven years after the
invasion the United States still has tens of thousands of troops in Iraq.
No one considers Iraq a success story nor is that likely for some time
to come. The situation in Afghanistan may be even worse. The
military failure, however, is only part of the story. It is only part of the
explanation for why when we discuss power in the world today we
include China, the European Union, perhaps India and other states.
Americans may not be universally outraged by either the invasion
of Iraq or the violation of international law respecting detainees, but
much of the rest of the world is. As a young human rights lawyer from
Congo said to me a few years ago, superpowers do not torture.
Following the election of Barack Obama, there was much hope in the
world that the United States would regain its standing. Yet, for many
that hope is dashed by the unlawful drone war in Pakistan, the
escalation of the war in Afghanistan, the slow drawdown in Iraq, the
24. See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE PosT-AMEmcAN WORLD (2008).
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continuation of many questionable Bush administration legal
positions, the decision to retain flawed military commissions, the delay
in closing Guantanamo Bay, the failure to investigate and prosecute
all but three private contractors for torture and abuse of detainees-
and more. President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but
chose to speak about the necessity of war. The opportunity to change
perceptions has been lost-for now. President John Kennedy was
given bad advice about a secret attack at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. He
changed direction and has gone down in history as a great president.
President Obama could change direction, too, and restore the United
States, if not to number one, certainly to the position of a leading and
admired nation that others again seek to emulate.
